consider the worst case -South Africain which, about 45,000 large-scale farmers own privately 85% of the agricultural land and then a million or so family farms own small pieces of land, about 1.1 hectares. Okay, for China this [1.1 hectares] might seem like a lot, but this is under dry lands, Savannah conditions. Zimbabwe similarly, before the first land reform, you had about 5000 farmers, large-scale farmers, owning 50% of the arable land, the best arable land, and around a million families owning the restmostly dry land farms. Q: There's a racial dimension to the land concentration. SM: Indeed, few farmers owned large lands which has better rainfall, better soils. As in Zambia, which has some smaller, medium-scale farmers, but they're not dominant owners of land. As a proportion, they don't own more than 20% of the agricultural land. The peasant families or subsistence farmers own most of the land under a customary system of tenure. In a customary system of tenure, besides the priority given to food crops, you also have common grazing lands, which is also an extensive system of livestock rearing, which has a relatively benign effect on the environmental conditions. So, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia are the extreme. Kenya had big European settlers. The settlers are mainly European. In South Africa, they're European, of Dutch and British origin. In Zimbabwe, mainly British. And, so that was the situation. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, you have a few lands also owned by the state, which historically tried to create strategic farms that can be used for specialist crops, maybe seedlings. But also as a demonstration to influence development around them. So, in those cases, the state-owned farms are very few. But, in the structural adjustment era, countries such as Zambia and many other African countries were privatizing the state farms first. So, outside of these countries most of the other countries on the continent have 90% of their agricultural land owned by family farms with customary tenure. Under this system, for every farm community member that begins a family, they get allocated a piece of land. Q: The drive for the land reform in Zimbabwe was not something that is top-down, necessarily. Struggles for land democratization have in fact pushed the government to deliver the promise of the liberation itself. Can you say a bit more about this process and your evaluation of the land reform? SM: In all these settler colonies, even in the other non-settler colonies, the European colonists gave some pieces of land to some plantations, even in Ghana, West Africa, even in Cameroon … But taking of land became a big issue in the anti-colonial struggle. So, if you take Zimbabwe, 120 years ago, this is when most of the land was taken over and population was still low. But as the population grew, the pressure on the land increased. Moreover, the population remobilizes for anti-colonial struggles in a national sense, from the 1950s. So from the 1950s, in Zimbabwe you had the nationalist movement, built on middle-class, urban professionals, not only the few who were trained and teachers, but also those with roots in communities, including chiefs, places that were dispossessed, which were agitatinglooking at decolonization as a way to also get back land, and provide majority rule. So, you can say that in the Zimbabwean case, from the 1950s, there was an increased agitationnationalistsand the slogan was, "Son of the Soil"those who own the soil that are dispossessed. Zimbabwe was one of the late decolonizers in southern Africa. There wasn't a compromise until 1980 after a protracted war. During the protracted war, in the 1970s, it had a beautiful Maoist tactic that combined with guerrilla warfare operating in the rural areas. So, the guerrilla war itself was another organic mobilization of the landless dispossessed as part and parcel of the broad nationalist liberation movement. So when the independence solution was done in 1980, there was an expectation that there would be a lot of land redistribution. In the negotiations with the British, the British had promised to pay for some land. They were trying to pre-empt an expropriation on a mass scale. So they had said they would financeeven the Americans said so in the negotiationsthey said they would put in a little bit of money in the 1980s. A small amount of land, about 15% of the land that the whites owned, was redistributed on the basis of the market. It was really disorganized, not very well-coordinated in terms of where you get the land, how much land you can get, how many people you can sell. Q: Why did Zimbabwe then settle for a Britishfinanced market-based land reform? With the liberation struggle, why couldn't people in Zimbabwe expropriate large land owners outright? SM: So at the beginning, Zimbabwe was a pawn, or an experiment in a new Cold War re-engagement or dialogue. Because, just before Zimbabwe's independence, Angola, Mozambique, had been liberated suddenly in 1974. This was at the height of the Cold War, and because there was a coup in Portugal, the military government in Portugal decided that "No, they cannot afford to engage in the fight, the war in Angola." Those countries took over the land in one swoop. But, in both countries, the Zimbabwean Rhodesian whites and South Africans, with some American back up, instigated a civil war. So, they got independence, took over the landeverything, followed by 15 years of civil war in Mozambique. The same thing happened in Angola. South Africans, backed one of the liberation movements, China had backed one, the Russians and Cubans backed one. So, there was a civil war, they pushed to control the MPLA, the people who are in power now, but there was a protracted civil war for over 20 years. So, when the Zimbabwean negotiations were happening, there was a theory in the negotiations that there could be a compromise that accommodates some of the whites and some redistribution, but the redistribution should be done on the market. And at any rate, there was no guarantee that South Africa and certain forces of the ancient regime in Rhodesia would not intervene militarily to create another civil war. Q: The threat was there. SM: There was a threat; the liberation movement had made gains, but not sufficient to guarantee the security. South Africans supported the negotiations, pushed by the Americans, led by the British to decolonize, on the basis of a compromise. Q: It's a conditional liberation. SM: It was conditional more or less. Most of the leaders in Zambia, Mozambique itself, were under pressure, saying "No, let's have a settlement or compromise." Partly tactical, but partly realistic. Tactically for someone wing of the liberation movementwho said, if we take over, we rebuild, retake state power and build a capacity to manage a reform depending on the circumstances. So, basically the Zimbabwean strategy was first to consolidate power, invest in education, people and increasingly, improving, take control of the military, the state. And, for some years the British financed it, but it was not working well. By 1989-1990, the Soviet Union was falling down. Everybody around is adopting structural adjustment. The geopolitical conditions were not in favor of a radical solution. Although the Zimbabwean government instituted some laws to expropriate land, they said "No, this thing is not working, so from now on, we're going to try to expropriate." The British then said "No, in that case we don't finance that." So the funding stopped. By the 15th year, there was a total breakdown of the promise of financing the land reform. On the ground there was a lot of pressure.
Class dynamics before and after the land reform Q: Speaking of pressures on the ground, can you talk about how the dynamics grew to push for land reform? SM: So basically, during the years from 1980 when the compromise was there, here and there communities were occupying land and the state was saying, "Okay, wait, we get the money, we buy." In some cases, they buy quickly … they buy where people are occupying. So, they try to control it and with the little bit of redistribution to keep it. But the economic growth was not so high as to provide serious alternatives outside of farming. The land reform was not delivering enough land. So the pressure was mounting as population was also growing. So, by 1995, the structural adjustmentthey adopted this thing, believing that maybe they would get new finances to retool industries to improvewasn't working. It was working out deindustrialization. So, instead, the adjustment was repressing the wages, remittances were less. The social conditions were getting worse, whereas the direct demand for land resources was increasing.
So there was a big social response in demand for a solution to land. The war veteranswe call them Liberation War Veteransare not just soldiers, but also part of communities. They began to organically support local movements, land occupation movements. And, at a certain point, the British said, "No, no, the new government came [in Britain] … it's not our responsibility, we are a labor party; we are not the conservationist or the capitalist." They created the diplomatic break in the policy of financing the land reform. So the War Veterans moved, mobilizedonce they mobilized, many other communities mobilized on their own. In the end it was the state trying to control it, which it did after a few years, "No, no, this is too much." Q: How did the land reform change the classrelations and land ownership? SM: So, the thing is that the Zimbabwean land reform introduces a different dimension to historical land reforms, insofar as the policy became one of class alliance between the peasantry, that's the landless, and some workers without jobs. How to give land to small producers, and at the same time how to accommodate the middle class, which was also under pressures as business was not working … So to create, what you were talking about in Zambia, the middle small farms, the plan was to give the peasants, the family farmers, and a few small commercial farms … Q: That's the government policy or plan? SM: That was the policy with two schemes: A1, A2, they call it. A1 is for the peasants. And, the other is for the middle, small-scale farms. So therefore, you have an inbuilt potential class contradiction, but the distribution of land is not as extensive as to generate sufficient conflict at a time when many small farmers are getting land. So instead of one big farmer, there might be six little farms in here. On here, instead of one big farmer, there will be 30 family farms. They accommodated so many in number that there was a general idea that redistributing was acceptable and the compromise was that "okay some might be commercial, they can get more land, they will invest," so that is the model they sought with the backing of the working class peasantry and middle class. Remember, the bureaucracy also had to be coopted to support land reform.
At the same time, another thing was happening. About 10%, let us say, of the land, agricultural land, was not expropriated for redistribution. They kept this for some estates. In the previous system, you had white commercial farms, large-scale farms. But you had a few estates, agro-industrial estates, you know the plantation for sugar with the big processing plant. Q: Who owns these estates? SM: This was the South African Anglo-American, some foreign companies. There were some in ranching … they took away excess land and redistributed land around and said that, "the small farmers can also grow sugar, integrate them." So, they compelled them to integrate small farmers because they wanted to save the processing plant. Q: So it's a form of contract farming. SM: Introduced contract farming, but if you had this estate with the big industrial plant, to redistribute it totally itself, one option was for the state farms to take that over. The other was to reduce the land, force them to introduce contract farming and then keep the land unit as one, as one integrated unit. So they kept some of those. In which case, in terms of class agrarian structure, you had a small plantation sector, an agro-industrial sector. Q: And this sector is owned by companies. SM: Companies, right, although the policy is that the land is taken away and the companies must get a lease for 99 years and the shareholding of these companies must be diluted to include more Zimbabweans instead of foreigners. And then you have these middle farmers that I talked about and the peasantry family farms. So, what happens is that you increase the amount of land and the number of peasantry. You've created a large number of small, medium-sized, capitalist farmswhich would depend not on their own labor but hiring and then you have a few plantations, which hire a lot of labor, capital intensive. So that's the structural basis of the class dynamics that you're asking me about. In another way, it's a peasant-dominated revolution, land revolution backed by a petty bourgeoisie, middle class but smaller and controlled. In both cases the land is still owned by the state, not private property. We cannot just sell it, so it's still controlled by the state. Q: Just to clarify, even the land owned by small or capitalist farmers … SM: … is owned by the state. But the state gives a grant and title to the family farmers, in perpetuity for the families. But it still owns it, meaning that they can't just sell it around, and you cannot just get a market in land to foreigners or to locals. It's a controlled process of reallocation. So they have, up until now, not allowed a land market. The state is in institutional control. Q: Within the class structure that you're speaking of, what is the role of small peasantry? SM: So what happens is that, obviously, naturally, in this system the peasantry predominantly use their own labor. But peasantry is differentiated: maybe some have more families, larger families, more relatives and can hire more because there are more resources of some sort, remittances or savings, whatever. So, already within the peasantry, a few will hire part-time to each other. But, in the A2 among the middle farms, there's also some hiring of labor from some of the peasantry or from others, because some people couldn't get land. There's only a limited amount of land. Q: So there are still landless people? SM: Well, "land-short" … and, unemployed, maybe the family might have land, but not enough. So, there is a labor market, but the labor market is not as before. Before, many people were confined and compelled to sell labor to large farms or to mines. But many more people now can farm for themselves. At the same time, however, there's still under-utilization of labor in some of the small farmsbecause irrigation, for instance, is not well developed, which means that you can't farm two crops a year. So, there's some excess labor, not excess all the time.
And there's some unemployed or seasonal demand for labor, to harvest. So there's a labor market which is less, we say, compelled as before, but it's still there. And therefore, to some extent, you have a differential accumulation in the certain section of the peasantry. There is no credit, or serious credit market because of the sanctions and the difficulties at the macro level. So you have a hiring of labor based on minimal investments, smaller arable lands. You have a differentiation in terms of labor extraction. But, it's more diffused. Now, secondly, many of the peasant and the middle farms produce some food, mainly fruit, staples, beans, etc. So you have many more producing some food for themselves. At the same time, a proportion of all of them is producing some cash crops, of which some of them are export crops. So we can say maybe about 20% of the tobacco used to be produced by larger scale white farmers, but now the majority of the producers are the family farms, plus some of the middle farms. About 65% is from the family and so here they're using labor-intensive methods. So you have in this a differentiation on the basis of some surplus crops. Twenty to thirty percent are able to produce reasonable quantities of a surplus of cash crops. Some of this can be maize surplus, it can be tobacco, cotton, or ground nuts. But many families are then able to sell either a small quantity of beans or ground nuts for cash income. About 20%, a differentiation. But this differentiation is somehow blocked in the sense that they can't buy out land, because there's a ceiling. Q: That's sort of the result of state intervention, isn't it? SM: State intervention in the land tenure system, and in the natural character of the redistribution. Q: In China, we have similar systems in the sense that there's no land market. But what happens is that the government allows families to lease their land-use right to other families or companies. So, in this way, capitalist farmers in China expand their production by having land-use-right transferred to them. SM: This is not allowed in the Zimbabwe, but it happens informally. Another thing happens also. Many of the families and the middlefarms invite and bring their relatives to work on the farms on the extra land. So in actual fact, you have more distribution than their official figures. But, you do not have a selling of land, a transfer of land to a few. At this stage, this is what is happening. In some of the middle farms, you have a system where some former white farmers clandestinely or indirectly engage in a financing of tobacco or something with the middle farmer. So there is some surrogate subletting, on a smaller scale. But, by and large, it's financed by contract finance. The contract financing of rich Chinese companies is a third of the contracts, although when they buy all the crops, it's closer to 50%. However, on the contract, it's close to one third, because the Anglo American, the former companies came back … Once things started picking up, they came back. By contract farming, the companies themselves have seen that there are advantages in financing different types of farmers. If they have experience or are reliable … so it's not just the big farmers … as I said, 65% are the family farmers with limited land. So you know the differentiation is in terms of income, but not necessarily in terms of land concentration. Q: With the intervention of the companies, do you see the process of differentiation then expedited? SM: It's expedited, but it's still some kind of containment. Because of the labor intensity, smaller producers can be reliable suppliers. So, contract farming is not structured in favor in accumulating the group that has more land or the ones who are richer. But relatively speaking, the ones that are in the contracts are better off because these are family farmers who have some skills, some experience. So, there is a differentiation, but it's not polarized in the classical sense of the idea of Lenin or even Maoist.
At any rate, this is new historically, in this context with the kind of state support and protection and controls. Even the contracting has been opened to many farmers, to many merchants. That is why I was saying these people are talking a lot of Chinese. Chinese! The Chinese are there, but they are an important part of three legs: Chinese, European, and Zimbabwean, three groups competing and looking for different opportunities. So that's the class dynamics.
One thing that's somewhere in my article, on a global scale, you still have a problem with the global dynamics of the market. And as you know, the tobacco that Zimbabwe supplies is of a special flavor, blending tobacco. What has happened obviously is that the land reform and new regulations by the state have transformed the monopoly auction floors to create more options for them, allowing the policy of contracting, buying directly that was not there before. By changing the marketing policy and with land reform redistribution enabling the redistribution of more suppliers, they have broadened production, supply and the market.
It means that they have cut the global circuit. You know, before, a few of the big tobacco companies -Anglo Americanused to buy all of this tobacco. And then they would sell to countries. So, in my view, China, for example, would have been buying tobacco before the land reform from merchants. I don't have the data, but clearly the land reform has changed the global dynamics. So, because the class dynamics and relations of capital have also changed, the racial dynamics are also changing. Before the land reform, the people who were in the middle of auction floors or marketing were all white; now we have a few more Black Zimbabweans, we have Chinese, yellow people, white people, black people, any color … this changed the dynamics and the practices, regulations … it may not be perfect, but it's different and probably better in some ways.
Implications of Zimbabwean land reform in and beyond Africa
Q: What is the implication of the land reform in Zimbabwe for the other African countries, which still had not had the land reform? SM: The implication is that Zimbabwe is breaking the monopoly at the level of markets, and it kind of enabled a competition at the global level that is the first implication. Many countries, the underlying factor of this is "How do you finance land reform?" or "Agrarian reform?" You get the story. Q: Well, in the case of South Africa, the South African government is interested in having one, but they have not been successful. SM: Let me take it from a different angle. If you do land reform in the radical way, you'll be punished by Western capital, and the landlords … everybody, that's what they do. The consequences of land reform, you have to be determined to do something radical and withstand the pressure. They will close the markets, close the finance, maybe even put you on sanctions. So there's a general fear where you won't get any more IMF loans or something. The circumstances in Zimbabwe is to go it alone and damn the consequences as they say. But that fear is based on the idea that "Okay, if we do this, who's going to produce the food or the export crop? Who's going to finance it? Who will market it?" Naturally, whenever you do a land reform, anywhere in the world, any time historically, you're not only changing land ownership, because once you change the production structure, the marketing has to change in response as you have different supply. And the financing also, because a lot of the farming is financed somehow, either by the state directly through subsidies or credit or by private credit and contracts or processors, so it's a whole structure that you are reforming.
So, the implications of Zimbabwe say that, "Actually if you plan it, there is more room for maneuver in terms of markets and finance." It's no more a situation where, "I'll lose the American markets so I'm dead." That's what I'm saying. Because I didn't mention, even the tobacco and cotton, I said it other day, generally … you also have Singapore, Indonesia buying small bits, Uganda buying … their merchants coming directly to buy. So, the markets have been removed from what I call a "settler-colonial economy." You've kind of unlocked it, opened it. So you have more possibilities to adjust if you do land reform, that's the first implication. Also it shows you that the ideology has been that certain crops, or certain things, you can only produce if you have larger farms or white people who have been used to farming for many years, whatever, you know it's a lot of propaganda. All of that is broken. Q: These myths are broken, including marketbased land reform. SM: Yes, many myths have been broken. Okay, you will suffer for some time, but you could survive suffering. Zimbabwe also shows that "Look, you can't depend on the market way of doing land reform." You know, this idea that "somebody will finance to buy that" … all these things have been broken. The question is the political will, but also the popular-orientation of the governments. The popular expectations and insights that come out of it suggest that it can influence more revolutionary behavior in South Africa. On the other side, it also means to the capitalists and their people, that maybe they can think about another way of enabling land reform that doesn't create a temporary destruction. So it has many implications. Politically, it also has other longer term implications, that the colonial dispossession can be overturned, although they still want compensation. So the big part of the Zimbabwe problem was the fear that if we succeed, if it goes through, it will influence South Africa, anywhere, Australia … Q: A domino effect! SM: A domino effect, that's bigger part of the picture. But also, as I was trying to say, it's more complicated in the sense that the settler economies are a part of the security regime of NATO, of the Anglo-European. Their presence in the economic and financial terms and in the social and intelligence terms, was part of trying to influence policies, to stabilize it within their interest, as well as in the interest of that security system.
Periphery, semi-periphery, imperialism
Q: That brings me to the question of imperialism, which you have written about. I appreciate your critique of David Harvey. I think David Harvey ignores how what is outside Euro-America also constitutes the postmodernism in Euro-America. So, your critique is very interesting because it brings the center-periphery relationship back into our understanding of imperialism itself. Is your critique of imperialism shared by critical intellectuals in Africa? SM: Yeah, you see the thing is that we have gone through a phase since the 1990s, the end of the Cold War, probably worsened by the demise of the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring brought some hope but it collapsed, it ended in more chaos. Therefore, much of the critical thoughts in Africa also turned a bit culturalist … misrepresenting capital, because the big problem is that people didn't realize, or did not have a theoretical way to understand that you have a continuous process of primitive accumulation under imperialism. That's one of the major pillars of our argument. We say that intellectuals have also been structurally adjusted. Q: This applies in Asia too [laughs] . SM: In a sense, because of what is happening in Zimbabwe. We were saying that it is possible that certain dynamics in the periphery shape or influence development such that there's resistance, or an opening up. That the argument is not just theoretical that we're advancing. It's also an argument that's based on empirical detail. We have criticized David Harvey, Henry Bernstein and some important European agrarian scholars directly, because they didn't think of agency. They talk about agency in the West but they don't talk about it in a radical sense.
Bernstein was saying that the agrarian question is dead. And, we're saying that it's not dead. There's still a lot of struggles on the ground, as I was saying. Even when the land grabbing was happening, which Harvey was not seeing, and Bernstein was not seeingbecause they were writing these things before 2000. So capital is moving and is behaving in the periphery, now in confrontation with so many diverse sources of capital, but also with different forms of resistance. And so you have a process, some contradictions, and struggles that are occurring that they never expected. And they never expected peasant-based movement, even if it's led by war veterans or that sort. They totally over-concluded what the trajectory should be. In other words, I'm just trying to say that the forces in the periphery are also under-estimated in the whole argument. And then, in that case, that critique applies to many of the classical Marxists in the West. Q: One point you made in your article is selfexploitation of the semi-proletariat being a key dimension of super-exploitation. Now this is a very key feature of many of the periphery countries, including some semi-periphery countries such as China. SM: Yes, yes! By the way, this is why we dispute the formulation of sub-imperialism. If you look at the characteristics, such that even if China has so much reserves and surplus, its internal characteristics put limitations on its capacity to be a classical imperialist. Q: Can you elaborate on your view? SM: Precisely what you're saying. China has to deal with the rural reconstruction and the whole subsidies and is kind of dependent in terms of the monies, how the reserves are held, to what extent it can actually fully deploy its reserves, to what extent western capital is in China and has some influence. So, you don't have the kind of autonomy and space. And at the same time, China can't maintain the state capitalist system, both in the enterprise and in terms of domestic finance. So, its characteristics are different. Q: This has been an issue of debate. So, are you saying that the feature, which is shared by China with many developing countries in terms of super-exploitation, in the semi-proletariat, in some ways has limited China's capacity to actually become a classical imperialist country? SM: Yes. If China had full control of the resources, the economy would transform differently in China, while going out. So, at this stage, it's going out for several resources in order to sustain a growth, but it has not resolved so many problems … internally, and it is limited. There's a limitation to China resolving its internal problems, whereas in the United States, they're resolving it slowly now by reducing wages. This is why the inequality that we saw is rising. In Europe, they have done it gradually, but by and large, there is still a pact that is maintained. Now, with other peripheral countries, and by definition with the peasantry, it has a tendency the logic of labor utilization isto realize at least a certain minimum use of the labor and income. So, even when prices go down, like cotton, as I just mentioned and so forth, they continue to deploy a certain amount of labor at below the average and also, in terms of gender differentiation, maybe women and children become more exploited. There are tendencies to self-exploit, in order to realize a minimum income, so they're also subsidizing the wage, if you could calculate the wage. It's lower than the average wage or what is a reasonable wage, a reproduction wage, but nonetheless it is probably more stable than the kind of informal wage labor in the markets. So being a peasant, semipeasant, still provides social protection. China still has a certain cover for social protection with the land, the way it's run even though you have this tendency to take away land. And in many of the African countries, the tenureland, tenure-policy is in fact the pillar of the social protection policy. Your residence, your home, your place to live, some basic subsistence, and then the production that you can do even if the price relations are poor.
Land reform and food sovereignty Q: In this context, let us talk about struggles for food sovereignty, particularly in the South. SM: Yeah, because the bottom line of all of this is to what extent food sovereignty should begin with the capacity of many producers who are confined or contained by rural economic circumstances to produce sufficiently. The peasantry are a critical element of any food sovereignty policy. That's the basic pillar. But because of the balance of requirementswages, education, health and all these other requirements, cash income requirements are necessary in today's peasantry. And if a peasant sells, it doesn't mean they're capitalist, because you know they may be doing it with their own labor, not exploiting somebody else's labor. So you have a dynamic competition between cash crops and food. But, in the colonial period, and in the present, with an IMF-directed economy and financing mechanisms, the tendencies are to push more certain export crops onto the peasantry. That is what is being financed. So nobody wants to come and finance Zimbabwe to produce more maize to feed itself. Or wheat. They say, "No, no, no, we can export them to you for cheap." So you have that contradiction that's inherent. And this is why you need such state polices that back up the food production, to begin with, the subsidies, therefore fighting the WTO-conditions. So already you have some protections, research and development. All these policies are necessary for food sovereignty. And, sovereignty is also protection, and so forth. Because, at any rate, there is no industrialization project that's giving these people jobs just to import food anyway. So food sovereignty, as a logic, is beyond food but is the employment of people, the work that they will do in producing the food in marketing, and building local economies, and so on … the perspective is broader. So there are some questions around which, under better terms or reasonable terms, certain foods might make sense to import rather than grow, because you grow more of others, which may be more suitable. For instance, wheat in Zimbabwe has collapsed. It was produced under irrigation. Now, wheat in most parts of the world, where there are surpluses, is produced by natural water. They have no energy costs, electricity costs, or pipes. These places are with surplus. So you can be spending a lot of money to try to produce wheat for bread for a class of people who eat bread. You're spending a lot of money on resources, such as electricity, water, and so on, when you could plant other crops, food and even cash crops, which may not take so much land.
So the whole concept of food sovereignty actually needs a definition, and will vary according to different circumstances. The issue is that if the bulk of your food has to be imported, in a situation where there is all this unemployed labor, or in the situation where you're handing over land to a few monopolies to produce exportsor even to a few peasants to produce exports, whicheverwhich bring low returns, and some of which are even unprocessed, then the whole thing doesn't balance. So the concept of food sovereignty needs adjustment. Q: Food sovereignty has critical connections with ecological protection and climate justice.
Here too it encounters of the power of transnational capital and transnational institutions. SM: There are issues about how you introduce agro-ecological and climate change issues. I think that the work on that is not yet very clear, but the point is that there may be very different ways in which small farmers, family farmers, can achieve high yields without necessarily using very intensive fertilizer, artificial or chemical, and without necessarily using GMOs. So that's the package. That's what I can say. That's the field where we are opening and few countries have the whole package. Zimbabwe, for instance, and Zambia, don't allow GMOs, which means that they compete with South Africa, which just produces GMOs and if there are problems, they can try to dumpnot only South Africa, but also Ukraine, and Australia, anywhere where you can try to dump wheat and maize, or even chickens that they feed with all of these GMOs and chemicals and so forth.
The primary problem with food sovereignty begins with the protection of the trade. It's a more complicated thing than people say, because you have to deal with a range of policies in which you then confront international capital, basically in confrontation with international capital and state power that is used to force you to conform to the regulations, WTO and so forth. Q: With the land reform, how have the control of other resources and the dynamics of social relationship been transformed? SM: The point is that, at a general level, land redistribution is not just an economic problem. It's also a political problem of power: who has control over resources. Control over land as an agricultural resource for crops, grazing, water resources; there's also controlling over some rivers, underground water, woodlands, and territorially, and homes where people can staythe right to stay somewhere … All of that is influenced by the unequal redistribution of power. When you redistribute, you create huge opportunities for many more people to be absorbed, accommodated. Q: How would you define land reform in Zimbabwe? Would you still say that Zimbabwe now has agrarian capitalism, but in a way that's more regulated? SM: Now, yeah, it has. The language for China, for instance, market socialism, is not the same, but it's a much more regulated re-distribution that's why I call it "re-distributive land reform" instead of "socialist land reform." In socialist, you have a redistribution, but the property right is not a market property right. In Zimbabwe, it's kind of a constrained capitalist, and it's re-distributive. For example, in 1980, there were 6000 guys who own all of this land; now you have 300,000 families. So, already you have, kind of, destroyed a market whose tendency was to keep concentrating. Even amongst the white farmers, fewer and fewer of them are taking more.
So, in terms of the process of the development of capitalism, people normally talk about monopoly capitalists, agrarian capitalism of large farms, capital intensity … , but that model has been changed into a more re-distributive one, with some labor intensive but accommodating many more people. So that is a system. But there's a differentiation amongst these 300,000some have more, others lessbut none has so much so as to disable others to have. But, my view is that, in the next few years, there will still be struggles, with people demanding that things should be redistributed a little bit more. So, regarding the redistribution, the importance of which is that you have a new model, we cannot just apply an old theoretical understanding of redistribution, or even socialism, because you have to have a pact between a broad range of classes, jointly to confront capitalin this case, international capitalby confronting the white land owners, and the governments that protect them because they're still citizens of the UK. So, you're confronting capital, the international state system, and the dominant state, the land owners, and banks, which were lending to them.
Zimbabwe, South Africa and delayed Bandung Q: Zimbabwe's land reform is not the kind of revolution that we had in China, nor the kind of land reform backed by the US in other countries. It does make some sense to say that it is late-Bandung, because different elements have been put together. SM: Even if you think about Mao and even Lenin later, in the beginning, they wanted to wipe out everybody, just keep some peasants, but in the end, "No we cannot attack even the petty kulaks, the rich … the very big land owners." But, because they needed a political alliance, but inherent in that alliance is a possibility of differentiation. Q: And the future contradictions. SM: That now also depends on the policies that you impose. And in the Zimbabwe case, there is that danger that the contradiction could … but we have to study that, we can't just guess. Q: It's also interesting that you have an understanding of these policies in light of Bandung. Is Zimbabwe calling for a new Bandung in some sense? SM: In the conclusion of our book, we expand the argument to explain what actually the regional dynamics are in the security. And to explain the "look east" is actually a part of the negotiation. You see, when Zimbabwe says that, it encourages other countries not to be intimidated by the critique of China. Not that China is a saint, we know that, we have made that critique. But, it kind of shifts the positions. Q: Well, thank you very much for a very interesting discussion.
